CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUSE PROHIBITS STATE-SPONSORED INVOCATIONS AT PUBLIC

SCHOOL GRADUATION CEREMONIES-Lee

v. Weisman, 112 S.

Ct. 2649 (1992).
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .

. . .'"

Ever since the Supreme Court first

applied the Establishment Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 the Court has struggled to ascertain the
I U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment contains two distinct clauses
that address religion, the Free Exercise Clause and the above quoted language,
which is generally referred to as the Establishment Clause. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 1155-57 (2d ed. 1988). The amendment

as originally proposed by James Madison to the First Congress provided: "The
Civil Rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
Madison is commonly viewed as having supported a strict separation between
church and state. See TRIBE, supra, § 14-3, at 1161. One commentator has rejected
this view, however, because Madison's proposal prohibited only a national religion
and did not circumscribe all government participation in religious affairs. See PETER
J. FERRARA, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: A REINTERPRETATION 20-21 (1983).

It is likely that many of Madison's contemporaries would have balked at the notion
that a state may not prefer religion over non-religion. See TRIBE, supra, § 14-3, at
1161 (advancing that one purpose of the Establishment Clause was to protect existing state religious establishments from federal interference); Laura Zwicker, The
Politics of Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND.
L.J. 773, 791-92 (1991) (arguing that the Framers' intent was not to create a "wall
of separation" between church and state). Peter Sylvester of New York, who delivered the opening speech in the First Congress's debate over the religion clauses,
expressed concern that the Establishment Clause would be viewed as completely

abolishing religion.

DANIEL

L.

DREISBACH,

REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW

51

(1987).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides,
in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
Id.
Before 1925, the Supreme Court uniformly rejected the proposition that the
Bill of Rights applied to the states. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.1, at 353 (4th ed. 1991). The Court reasoned that the
constitutional amendments comprising the Bill of Rights "contain[ed] no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments." Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). Additional cases evidencing the Court's early
refusal to apply the Bill of Rights to the states, include Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 74 U.S. 321, 325-27 (1869); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84, 89-91 (1858);
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permissible extent of state involvement in religion. 3 Some memFox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 434-35 (1847); Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S.
469, 551-52 (1833). Although the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the
Supreme Court failed to recognize the full power of the Amendment until the turn
of the century, when the Court struck a Louisiana statute because it deprived an
individual of his "liberty" rights without affording him due process of law. See NoWAR & ROTUNDA, supra, § 11.2, at 361-62 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897)). In 1925, the Court abandoned its early precedents and applied one of the
Bill of Rights guarantees to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The modern Court has selectively incorporated the Bill of Rights' protections and presently
applies most of them to the states. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 11-6, at 385-87.
The Court applied the Establishment Clause to state action for the first time in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-2, at 1156;
see infra notes 26-29. Many scholars, however, have argued that the Establishment
Clause was never intended to apply to the states. See, e.g., DREISBACH, supra note 1,
at 90; FERRARA, supra note 1, at 25. Commentators cite the plain text of the amendment to support this contention because the amendment contains no reference to
state action, but instead provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. FERRARA, supra note 1, at 25. Furthermore, representative James Blaine introduced a resolution that would have specifically mandated
that the First Amendment be applied to the states. See DREISBACH, supra note 1, at
92. The Forty-Fourth Congress, which included twenty-three members of the Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment, refused to adopt this resolution. Id.
By 1950, proposals similar to Blaine's were rejected by Congress at least twentyfive times. Id. See also Stanley Morrisson, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporatethe
Bill of Rights? TheJudicial Interpretation,2 STAN. L.REv. 140, 173 (1949) (claiming that
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment is an "effort to
put into the Constitution what the [F]ramers failed to put there").
Although the practice of selective incorporation is rarely questioned by the
courts today, some pockets of resistance remain. See RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC
PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1987).

Disregarding Supreme Court prece-

dent, Judge W. Brevard Hand ruled that the First Amendment was not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F.
Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 459
U.S. 1314 (1983). Judge Hand concluded that the legislative history of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments "leaves no doubt that those amendments were not
intended to forbid religious prayers in the schools which the states and their political subdivisions mandate." Id. at 1128. For an analysis ofJudge Hand's reasoning
inJaffree, see SMITH supra at 145-70; cf Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 257 (1963) (BrennanJ., concurring) (reasoning that it is "too late in the day"
to challenge the process of selective incorporation).
3 SeeJ. Woodford Howard, Jr., The Robe and the Cloth: The Supreme Court and Religion in the United States, 7 J.L. & POL. 481, 482 (1991) (positing that the Supreme
Court still searches for standards of adjudication for the religion clauses). Significantly, Justice Blackmun has conceded that "[t]his is an area where we have not
done well." Stuart Taylor Jr., The Morning Line on the Bench, Revised, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1986, at B10. Chief Justice Burger also expressed the Court's difficulty in
this area when he explained that the "language of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment is at best opaque," and acknowledged that "we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional
law." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 2, § 17.3 n.2, § 17.4, at 1181 (observing that the individual Justices disagree
about the purpose of the Establishment Clause); FERRARA, supra note 1, at 13 n.30
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bers of the United States Supreme Court have advocated a complete separation between government and religious affairs, 4 while
others have been willing to uphold certain state actions that endorse religion.5 Despite this ongoing debate, a majority of the
Court continues to reject state-initiated religious observances in
the public schools. 6 Recently, the United States Supreme Court
(explaining that "Supreme Court precedents relating to the religion clauses are
confused and contradictory").
4 See Howard, supra note 3, at 498. Justice Rutledge espoused the view that the
Establishment Clause forbade "[nlot simply an established church, but any law respecting an establishment of religion .... " Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
31 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge believed that the Framers'
intention to completely separate church and state was supported by Madison's writings. See id. at 31-72 (RutledgeJ., dissenting) (citing Madison on nearly every page
of a thirty-five page dissent and appending the entirety of Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance to the opinion). Justice Jackson shared a similar view. See Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (JacksonJ. dissenting).
Justice Black opined that a state may not constitutionally use tax-raised funds
to support religious schools, "even to the extent of one penny." Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has echoed
the view of Alexis de Tocqueville that a strict separation of church and state is not
only mandated by the Constitution, but is desirable for its effect of invigorating the
spirits of both religion and freedom. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822
(1983) (Brennan J., dissenting).
5 See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, High School Prayers at Graduation:
Will the Supreme Court Pronounce the Benediction?, 69 EDUC. L. REP. 189, 199 (1991)
(surveying the current Justices' views on Establishment Clause adjudication). According to Justice Story, when the First Amendment was drafted "the general, if
not the universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 726 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). Mindful of the
difference between encouraging and coercing religious observance, Justice Story
posited that the preeminent purpose of the Establishment Clause was not to harm
or help non-Christians, but to prevent rivalry among religious sects "and to prevent
any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government." Id. at 727-28. Justice Black has
posited that "[tihe First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952). Justice Stewart has argued that prayer in schools should be permitted
because it provides children the opportunity to share in the nation's "spiritual heritage." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart J., dissenting). Chief
justice Burger has concluded that a complete separation between church and state
is not possible. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). Justice Powell
observed that "[i]t has never been thought ... desirable to enforce a regime of total
separation" between church and state. Committee For Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
6 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (overturning a statute that mandated the teaching of creation science in public schools where theory of evolution is
taught); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a moment of silence
statute); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (striking a statute that required the
Ten Commandments to be posted in public school classrooms); Epperson v. Ar-
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ruled on the constitutionality of invocations 7 and benedictions 8
at public high school graduations in Lee v. Weisman.9 In Lee, the
Court held that a state-sponsored nonsectarian prayer at a public
school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause.10
OnJune 20, 1989, Deborah Weisman attended a formal ceremony that marked her graduation from public junior high
school." Despite protests from Weisman and her father, 12 the
program included the introduction of a rabbi to deliver an invocation. 13 The principal, Robert E. Lee, provided the rabbi with a
copy of "Guidelines for Civic Occasions"' 4 and explained that
the prayers should be nonsectarian. 15 At the ceremony, Weisman and her classmates rose for the Pledge of Allegiance and
continued to stand during the invocation,' 6 which presumably
kansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited any
state-supported school from teaching the theory of evolution).
7 "Invocation" is defined as: "The action or act of invoking or calling upon
(God, a deity, etc.) in prayer or attestation; supplication, or an act or form of supplication, for aid or protection." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 54 (2d ed. 1989).
8 "Benediction" is defined as: "The utterance of a blessing; solemn invocation
of blessedness upon a person; devout expression of a wish for the happiness, prosperity, or success of a person or enterprise .... THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 109 (2d ed. 1989). Throughout this Note, the terms "invocation" and "school
prayer" will be used to encompass both invocations and benedictions.
9 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
10 Id. at 2661. The Court invalidated the state practice by a five-Justice majority
over a strong dissent. Id. at 2649.
II Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.R.I. 1990). Weisman's school was
located in Providence, Rhode Island. Id. Most middle school graduations in Providence take place on school grounds; high school graduation ceremonies are usually
held elsewhere. Id.
12 Id. Weisman's father, Daniel Weisman, sought a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the rabbi from delivering the invocation. Id. This motion, which was filed
several days before the ceremony, was denied because the court did not have adequate time to examine the case. Id.
13 Id. The practice of offering invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies was a tradition in the Providence public schools. Id.
14 Id. "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" is a pamphlet drafted by the National
Conference of Christians and Jews. Id. The pamphlet is intended to guide speakers in forming nonsectarian prayers with "inclusiveness and sensitivity." Id.
'5 Id.
16 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2653 (1992). The text of the invocation and
benediction delivered was as follows:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America
where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to
enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may
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lasted less than two minutes. 17
After the ceremony, the Weismans instituted an action in the
United States District Court for Rhode Island seeking a permanent injunction that would prohibit the Providence School District from continuing its longstanding practice of offering
religious invocations at graduation ceremonies.'" The district
court found that prayer' 9 at a public school graduation ceremony
has the impermissible effect of advancing religion. 20 The district
participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank
You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of
Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people,
who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN
BENEDICTION
0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the
capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an
important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future,
help them to understand that we are not complete with academic
knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You require of
us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us
and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion. AMEN
Id. at 2652-53 (quoting App. 22-23).
17 Id. at 2653.
18 Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D.R.I. 1990). Although the ceremony
had already taken place, Weisman retained standing to bring suit because there was
a high probability that a similar invocation would be conducted at her high school
graduation ceremony as well. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2654 (1992).
19 The parties stipulated that the rabbi's presentations were "prayers" and that
the case turned on an interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Weisman, 728 F.
Supp. at 70.
20 Id. at 71. The court explained that, by sponsoring the invocation, the state
created a "symbolic union" of church and state. Id. at 72 (quoting Grand Rapids
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392 (1985)). The court rejected the school district's contention that Marsh v. Chambers should apply. Id. at 73-74 (citing Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). In Marsh, the Supreme Court validated prayer at
the opening of each session of the Nebraska state legislature. Marsh, 463 U.S. at
795. The district court explained that the Marsh holding was limited to the specific
facts of that case and would not apply in a public school setting. Weisman, 728 F.
Supp. at 74. The district court also rejected the reasoning of a circuit court decision which suggested in dicta that nondenominational prayer at a high school graduation ceremony would be constitutional. Id. at 73-74 (citing Stein v. Plainwell
Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (6th Cir. 1987)). In dismissing use of
the Stein decision as clear precedent, the district court noted that each of the three
judges in Stein wrote opinions utilizing different reasoning. Id. at 74 n.9.
Since the district court's decision in Stein, other courts have faced similar issues. See Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989);
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court, therefore, held that the school district's practice regarding
invocations at graduation ceremonies was unconstitutional. 2'
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed without opinion,22 and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 23 to determine whether a state-sponsored invocation at a public graduation ceremony is permissible under
the Establishment Clause. 24 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy held that, by inviting clergy to deliver an invocation, the
school district violated the First Amendment mandate that govJones v. Clear Creek Independent School Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, rejecting an application of
Marsh, held that a state-sponsored invocation before a high school football game
was unconstitutional. Jager, 862 F.2d at 831. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, however, has validated a public high school's practice of allowing volunteer members of the graduating class to deliver an invocation at the
graduation ceremony. Jones, 930 F.2d at 423.
21 Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 75. Despite this ruling, the district court was not
without sympathy for the school district's position. See id. Judge Boyle stated
poignantly:
The fact is that an unacceptably high number of citizens who are undergoing difficult times in this country are children and young people.
School-sponsored prayer might provide hope to sustain them, and
principles to guide them in the difficult choices they confront today.
But the Constitution as the Supreme Court views it does not permit
[school prayer].
Id. at 75.
Judge Boyle further posited that the prohibition of any "union" of prayer and
public school may cause students to turn away from religion. Id. at 72 n.7. The
Judge also stated that "[t]here is no factual basis for an historical argument that the
[F]irst [A]mendment was intended by the drafters to isolate religion from education." Id. at 73 n.8.
22 Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). Judge Bownes concurred
and, after reviewing Establishment Clause history and original intent, frankly stated
that the " 'historical record' is inconclusive." Id. at 1093 (Bownes, J., concurring).
Judge Bownes rejected, as had the district court, the application of Marsh and found
the Stein decision unpersuasive. Id. at 1096 (Bownes, J., concurring). Judge
Bownes concluded that he might have found a constitutional violation even if a
deity was not mentioned in the invocation. Id. at 1097 (Bownes, J., concurring).
Citing Marsh and Stein with approval, dissenting Judge Campbell suggested
that invocations should be permitted, provided that "persons representative of a
wide range of beliefs and ethical systems are invited to give the invocation." Id. at
1099 (Campbell, J., dissenting). Judge Campbell, as the district court before him
and the Supreme Court after him, found it ironic that public school students are
subjected to destructive habits such as drug-abuse and televised violence but denied a two minute prayer at their graduation ceremony. See id. at 1098 (Campbell,
J., dissenting); Cf Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 75 (opining that prayer may be beneficial to a great number of students); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992)
(noting that students are regularly subjected to offensive and irreligious ideas in
their studies).
23 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
24 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
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ernment action may not coerce participation in religious
exercise. 25
The Supreme Court first applied the Establishment Clause
to the states, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education.26
The Court in Everson reviewed a New Jersey statute that reimbursed parents of children in public and private schools for the
cost of school transportation.27 Interpreting the language of the
First Amendment, the Court announced that the Establishment
Clause placed a substantial restriction on government involvement with religion.28 Nevertheless, the majority in Everson upheld the New Jersey law, reasoning that the statute benefitted the
aid recipients irrespective of their religious beliefs.29
25 Id. at 2655.Justice Kennedy also stated that the school district ran afoul of the
Establishment Clause by "act[ing] in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.' " Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
678 (1984)).
26 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). For a discussion of the Court's incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 2.
27 Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. The statute allowed the parent of any school child to
be reimbursed for transportation expenses provided the students did not attend a
private school that operated for profit. Id. at 1 n. 1. Thus, some of the funds were
distributed to parents of children who attended Catholic schools. Id. at 1.
28 Id. at 15. The Court relied heavily on an historical analysis in reaching this
conclusion. See id. See also Jonathan K. Van Patten, In the End Is the Beginning: An
Inquiry Into the Meaning of the Religion Clauses, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 13-18 (1983)
(questioning the accuracy of the analysis used by the Court). Justice Black, writing
for the Court, explained:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the lause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation' between church and State.
Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
29 Id. at 18. The Court explained that churches and church schools also receive
services available to the general public, such as police and fire protection, use of
sewage disposal lines, and public highways and sidewalks. Id. at 17-18. The First
Amendment, the Court declared, does not mandate that the state be an adversary
of religious believers. Id. at 18. Rather, the Court asserted, the Constitution requires the state to adopt a position of neutrality toward religion. Id. Thus, the
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The Court first considered whether the Establishment
Clause permits the practice of religion in public schools in Illinois
ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education.3 ° In this case, the Court
invalidated a school district's policy of allowing religious instruction on school grounds during school hours. 31 The government's support and control of religious practices in the schools,
the Court explained, was a clear violation of the Establishment
Clause. 2 Specifically, the Court observed that children were
Court reasoned that the state did no more than offer a program of assistance without regard to religious affiliation, a position in accord with the First Amendment.
Id. But see Howard, supra note 3, at 494-95 (reflecting that in the very case where
the Court announced the strict standard of separation between church and state,
the Court compromised that standard by upholding the New Jersey law).
The Court has since had some difficulty in applying consistent reasoning to
other school-aid cases. See Developments in the Law, Religion and the State, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1680 (1987) [hereinafter Developments]. See also Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking by 5-4 vote practice of using state funds to
compensate public school teachers who also teach in religious schools); Grand
Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding by 5-4 vote program in
which the state provided instruction to non-public school students in classrooms
leased from non-public schools impermissibly advances religion); Committee for
Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating by 6-3 vote tuition reimbursement and tax relief plan to parents of non-public school children); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding unconstitutional by 8-1 vote direct subsidies to non-public schools and teachers); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968) (upholding by 7-2 vote state's lending of textbooks to private school
children).
30 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
31 Id. at 205, 210. Children attended classes that were taught by religious teachers from the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths at their parents' request. Id. at
207. These weekly classes lasted thirty to forty-five minutes. Id. at 207-08. Nonparticipating students pursued secular studies in another part of the school building. Id. at 209.
32 Id. at 209-10. The eight Justice majority concluded: "This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to
aid religious groups to spread their faith." Id. at 210. The majority opined that the
wall that separates church and state "must be kept high and impregnable." Id. at
212. The Court's enforcement of this principle in McCollum caused a considerable
stir. Samuel A. Alito, Note, The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J. 1202, 1202 (1974). For example, ten
bishops and four Cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church called the McCollum decision a victory for "doctrinaire secularism." Id. (citation omitted).
Commentators have also expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome in the McCollum case. See, e.g., id.; ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HisTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 143 (1982). Professor Cord has criticized the
Court for basing its Establishment Clause principles on a distorted view of history.
CORD, supra, at 145. Professor Cord has identified a paradox in the Supreme
Court's logic. Id. at 135-41. While the Supreme Court relies on the writings of
Jefferson, Professor Cord explains, many ofJefferson's own proposals, which advocated a close relationship between state universities and religious schools, would
have failed to pass constitutional muster under the Court's present view of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 135-37.
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subject to compulsory attendance laws 3 and the superintendents
of school monitored the religious instructors.3 4 Although the
Court in McCollum foreclosed the possibility of religious instruction in the school building, the Court left open the question of
whether the Establishment Clause allows schools to release students from secular classes for religious instruction off school
property. 5
Four years later, the Supreme Court addressed this question
in Zorach v. Clauson. 6 In Zorach, the Court examined a "released
time" program, which allowed religious instruction during
school hours but off school grounds. 37 Adopting the view that
the state was merely cooperating with religious institutions rather
than using the public schools to further religious interests, the
Court upheld the program. 8 Writing for the majority, Justice
33 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205. Under the Illinois compulsory education law, parents were required to send their children, between the ages of seven and sixteen, to
either public or private school. Id. Parents who did not do so were subject to a
fine. Id.
34 Id. at 208. The superintendent held the power to reject religious instructors
from the program and also exercised discretion over whether certain religious
groups would be invited to the school. Id. at 208 n.3.
35 Alito, supra note 32, at 1226.
36 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Zorach is often cited for the proposition that "[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Yehudah
Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986)
(citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
37 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315. Instruction classes were given only to students whose
parents submitted written consent. Id. at 308. The statute limited the religious
classes given on school time to one hour per week. Id. at 308 n. 1. Non-participating students remained in regular classes. Id. at 308.
38 Id. at 314. The Court explained that by cooperating with religion, the state
"follow[ed] the best of our traditions." Id. The three dissenters viewed the program in Zorach as no more acceptable than the one in McCollum, because both used
the state's power to further religious interests. See id. Justice Jackson, disagreeing
with the Court's validation of the released time religious training program, stated
that "[t]he wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and State
has become even more warped and twisted than I expected." Id. at 325 (Jackson,J.,
dissenting). After the Supreme Court announced its decision in Zorach, Justice
Jackson lamented that "[t]he battle for separation of Church and School is lost." See
Howard, supra note 3, 496 (citing Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Felix Frankfurter (April 30, 1952)). One scholar has suggested that by allowing the released
time program in Zorach, the Court was responding to an overwhelming public support for the program. See Alito, supra note 32, at 1228; see also Howard, supra note
3, at 496 (calling Zorach and Everson "sobering lessons regarding popular limits on
judicial power").
Professor Cord criticized the dissenters' view in Zorach that the combination of
the released time programs and compulsory school attendance laws amounted to a
union of church and state. CORD, supra note 32, at 174. If attendance at parochial
schools, where religious teachings are pervasive, can be used to satisfy the state's
compulsory education laws, Professor Cord argued, then the weekly one-hour class
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Douglas distinguished the McCollum case by asserting that the released time program in Zorach was held off of school property
and involved no funding by the state.39
The Supreme Court faced the issue of state-composed
school prayer for the first time in Engel v. Vitale,4 ° where the parents of ten pupils challenged a New York school district's practice of opening each school day with a prayer. 4 With only one
Justice dissenting, the Court held that a state may not, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, mandate prayer at the beginning
of each school day.4 2 The majority declared that the government
was prohibited from engaging in the writing or sanctioning of
official school prayers. 43 Justice Black, writing for the Court,
at issue in Zorach must be permitted as well. Id. Professor Cord took the argument
one step further to argue that if parochial schools are accepted as a substitute for
public school, then the religious schools should be able to receive state aid. Id. at
175.
39 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308-09. For an attempt at explaining the apparent contradiction in the McCollum and Zorach decisions, see Alito, supra note 32, at 1228-33.
40 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
41 Id. at 423. The text of the prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
42 Id. at 436, 444. Justice Black, writing for the majority, relied on Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, a document submitted by
Madison to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1785. See
Letter from James Madison to the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in DREISBACH, supra note 1, at 173-77. The Remonstrance expressed Madison's view that the right of freedom of conscience is among the most
basic rights of man. See id. Madison wrote:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the
conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every
man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because
what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.
Id. at 173.
Justice Stewart, unable to conclude that the school district's practice amounted
to an "establishment of religion," dissented. Engel, 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). TheJustice maintained that the case should be decided in light of"the
history of the religious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of
the institutions and officials of our government." Id. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting). After describing the religious practices of the three branches of the government, Justice Stewart concluded that if the Federal Government can engage in such
practices, then the states can too. See id. at 446-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 435. The majority declared that its holding was "neither sacrilegious
nor antireligious." Id. In the years following the Court's holding in Engel, the ma-
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found no merit in the argument that the prayer at issue was nondenominational.4 4 Moreover, that participation was voluntary,
Justice Black explained, could not save the practice, as the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from establishing an
official religion regardless of whether the state attempts to force
participation. 45 The Court's decision in Engel, however, did not
stop the states from attempting to establish religious practices in
the public schools.4 6
In Abington School Districtv. Schempp 47 , the parents of two public school children brought separate challenges to Pennsylvania
and Maryland statutes that required Bible readings at the beginning of each school day. 48 The Schempp Court, in determining the
validity of the statutes, inquired into their purpose and primary
jority's view has encountered considerable resistance. Developments, supra note
29, at 1661. The Court's decision was often disregarded by school boards, which
mandated the recitation of prayers. Id. at 1661 & n.105. Congress has also voiced
its opposition. Id. at 1661 n.7. Within twenty-four hours of the Court's decision in
Engel, ten Congressmen responded with vitriolic attacks on the Supreme Court.
KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS:
FROM COURT POLICY To LOCAL PRACTICE 27 (1971). Congress has been presented
with at least two-hundred constitutional amendments which would permit voluntary school prayer. Developments, supra note 29, at 1661 & n.7. President Reagan
proposed a school prayer amendment that provided: "Nothing in this Constitution
shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or other
public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or by any
State to participate in prayer." Message to the Congress Transmitting a Proposed
Constitutional Amendment on Prayer in School, PUB. PAPERS 647-48 (1982). More
recently, President Bush has expressed the view that voluntary prayer should be
returned to the public schools and has similarly called upon Congress to pass a
constitutional amendment. Remarks at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention in
Atlanta, Georgia, PUB. PAPERS 615 (1991). See also CHARLES E. RICE, THE SUPREME
COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER: THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT 157 (1964) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has erred in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the
best solution to the problem is a constitutional amendment).
44 Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
45 Id. at 430-31.
46 See Developments, supra note 29, at 1660-62.
47 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
48 Id. at 205. The Pennsylvania statute provided in relevant part:
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any
child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian.
Id. (quoting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960)). Pursuant to Art. 77,
§ 202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the Baltimore City Board of School
Commissioners adopted a rule providing for opening exercises in city schools including " 'reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use
of the Lord's Prayer.'" Schempp, 374 U.S. at 211.

1993]

NOTE

1107

effect. 49 Applying this standard to the Pennsylvania and Mary-

land laws, the Court found that the statutes had no secular purpose and had the primary effect of advancing religion. 50 The
Court opined that the Establishment Clause required government neutrality toward religion. 5 ' A statute that has the purpose
or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, according to
the Court, violates this principle.52 In so holding, the Court summarily rejected claims that its decision tended to permit a "religion of secularism.,

53

49 Id. at 222 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
50 Id. at 223. Specifically, the Court noted that the state was requiring Bible
reading in a public school, which children were required by law to attend. Id.
Thus, Justice Clark distinguished the case from Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952), in which religious exercises were held off school grounds and controlled by
a non-state entity. Id.; see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952).
The Court also differentiated between the First Amendment's prohibition of
establishment of religion and its protection of the free exercise of religion.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-23. The Free Exercise Clause, the Court explained, was
designed to prevent governmental invasion into an individual's religious liberty. Id.
at 223. The Court stressed, however, that a violation of that clause requires a
showing of coercion that "operates against [the complainant] in the practice of his
religion." Id. A violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court explained, need
not be predicated on such a showing. Id. See also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at
2649, 2664 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasizing that "our precedents
make clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation").
Some commentators hold the view that the Constitution permits state recognition of religion on a non-denominational basis and therefore the prayer in Engel
and the Bible reading in Schempp should have been upheld. SMITH, supra note 2, at
181. Professor Smith explained, however, that Bible reading might fail to pass constitutional scrutiny because use of a particular Bible version could evidence a preference for one religious group over another. Id. at 183.
51 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. Many commentators have rejected the idea that the
Constitution mandates government neutrality toward religion. See, e.g., DREISBACH,
supra note 1, at 49-50; CORD, supra note 32, at 15. Dreisbach asserts that the idea
that a state must be neutral in matters of religion is a radical misreading of history.
DREISBACH, supra note 1, at 49-50. The Constitution, posited Dreisbach, was not
intended to create a secular state, but rather "to perpetuate a Christian order." Id.
(quoting RouSAS JOHN RuSHDOONY, THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 2
(1978)). See also Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 514 (1968)
(arguing that the neutrality theory advocated by the Supreme Court collides with its
activist approach of prohibiting all government aid to religion); RICHARD C. MCMILLAN, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN INTRODUCTION 105-08 (1984) (discussing the view of government neutrality toward religion).
52 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. The "purpose" and "primary effect" tests were

later incorporated as the first two prongs of the Lemon test. See Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971); notes 58-61, infra, and accompanying text.
53 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. The Court stated, however, that an objective program of Bible study would be permissible under the Establishment Clause. Id. Jus-
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Armed with the precedents of Everson, McCollum, Engel and
Schempp, the Supreme Court in Epperson v. Arkansas 54 invalidated a
state law that prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution. 5 The Court concluded that the statute had a religious purpose.5 6 The statute, the Court reasoned, aimed to exclude
teachings that conflicted with the beliefs of a religious group and
thus violated the Establishment Clause.5 7
Following Epperson, the Court established the modern standard for adjudicating Establishment Clause cases in the landmark
decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 8 In this case, the Court examined
tice Goldberg, in a concise yet insightful concurring opinion in Schempp,
foreshadowed what was to be the root of controversy and divisiveness among members of the Court. See id. at 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg
explained:
The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent
and which do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of religion as to have meaningful
and practical impact. It is of course true that great consequences can
grow from small beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat
and mere shadow.
Id.
54 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
55 Id. at 99 n.3, 103. The statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any teacher of other instructor in any University, College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of the State,
which is supported in whole or in part from public funds derived by
State and local taxation to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind
ascended or descended from a lower order of animals and also it shall
be unlawful for any teacher, textbook commission, or other authority
exercising the power to select textbooks for above mentioned educational institutions to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook
that teaches the doctrine or theory that mankind descended or ascended from a lower order of animals.
Id. at 99 n.3 (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1627 (1960 Repl. Vol.)). Teachers who
violated the Act were subject to a five hundred dollar fine and removal from their
position. Id.
56 Id. at 107-09. As it did in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), the Court made clear that an objective study of the Bible "from a literary
and historic viewpoint" need not fall within the ambit of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 106.
57 Id. at 107-08. One scholar who disagreed with the Court's view that a state
may not favor religion, nevertheless agreed with the Court's holding in Epperson.
See CORD, supra note 51, at 15, 194. Professor Cord deemed the Court's task in
Epperson relatively uncomplicated. Id. Professor Cord expressed that a state may
favor religion, but may not constitutionally prefer one religion over another. Id.
Thus, Professor Cord explained that because the intention and effect of the antievolution law struck down in Epperson was to advance the religious beliefs of "fundamental Christians," the law must fail. Id.
58 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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the propriety of state funding intended to augment secular education in non-public schools, and created a three part test in an
attempt to provide more specific guidelines in this area of constitutional adjudication.5 9 The test provided that "the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; . . . its principal or primary

effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion...
[and it] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' "60 In Lemon, the Court found that by providing

financial assistance to non-public schools, the state fostered excessive government entanglement with religion and therefore violated the First Amendment. 6 '
Although Lemon concerned state aid, the Court has subsequently utilized its standards to invalidate nearly all challenged
religious practices in the public schools.6 2 For example, in Stone
59 Id. at 607-13. Lemon involved Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes. Id. at
606. The Rhode Island statute provided salary supplements to non-public school
teachers who taught only secular classes. Id. at 607 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-511 (Supp. 1970)). The Pennsylvania statute provided payments to non-public
schools for operating expenditures related to only secular subjects. Id. at 609-10
(citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Supp. 1971)). The Court found that
about ninety-five percent of the pupils who benefitted from the statutes attended
schools that were associated with the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 610.
60 Id. (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 613-14. Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Burger distinguished Lemon
from previous state aid cases. Id. at 621. The Court recognized that the programs
in which the state provided aid to parents of public and private school children for
transportation did not violate the Establishment Clause because the aid had been
provided directly to the students' parents. Id. In Lemon, the Court explained, the
state aid was provided only to private schools. Id. at 611-12. The Court also acknowledged the validity of a program where the state lent textbooks to private
schools. Id. at 613 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)). In that
case, the Court reasoned, the program did not offend the Establishment Clause
because the textbooks' content could easily be ascertained. Id. at 617. The potential for entanglement in this case, ChiefJustice Burger continued, existed because
the statutes would require the states to monitor the teachers' lessons to ensure
their secular content. Id. at 617, 620.
62 Gregory M. McAndrew, Invocations at Graduation, 101 YALE L.J. 663, 664 n.6
(1991). Although the Lemon test has been consistently applied in the public school
cases, it has met with considerable criticism by members of the Court. See, e.g.,
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (opinion of KennedyJ.);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Id. at 91 (White,
J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (opinion of
White, J.). Commentators have also expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test.
See Nancy B. Hersman, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Has the Lemon Test Soured?, 19
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 133, 141 (1985) (contending that the Lemon test contributed more
confusion than clarity to Establishment Clause cases); Developments, supra note 29,
at 1644; Howard, supra note 3, at 504 (noting that consistent application of the
Lemon test has been troublesome).
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v. Graham,63 the Court reviewed a Kentucky statute that required
a copy of the Ten Commandments 64 to be displayed in each public school classroom.65 The majority in Stone, reversing the judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court, 6 6 held that the statute
violated the first prong of the Lemon test because it had a plainly
religious purpose. 67 In so holding, the Court brushed aside arguments that the statute had a secular purpose, that the Ten
Commandments were never read aloud, and that the posted copies were purchased through voluntary contributions. 6' Authoring a strong dissent, Justice Rehnquist asserted that a complete
separation between church and state is not required by the Establishment Clause.69
Although the Court permitted state involvement with reli449 U.S. 39 (1980).
The Ten Commandments are:
I. I, the Lord, am your God, who brought you out of the land of
Egypt, that place of slavery. You shall not have other gods before me.
II. You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain.
III. Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day.
IV. Honor your father and your mother, that you may have a long
life in the land which the Lord, your God, is giving you.
V. You shall not kill.
VI. You shall not commit adultery.
VII. You shall not steal.
VIII. You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.
IX. You shall not covet your neighbor's house.
X. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, nor his male or female
slave, nor his ox or ass, nor anything else that belongs to him.
Exodus 20:2-17; Deuteronomy 5:6-21 (Catholic Guild Edition).
65 Stone, 449 U.S. at 39. The funds for the program were to be raised through
voluntary contributions. Id. at 40 n. 1. At the bottom of the document was printed:
"The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption
as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the
United States." Id. (quoting Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 158.178 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1980)).
66 Id. at 43.
67 Id. at 41-43. The Court denied oral argument and based its per curium opinion
solely upon the record below. Id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 41-42.
69 Id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector be insulated from all
things which may have a religious significance or origin" and admonished the majority for its "cavalier summary reversal" of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id. at
45-47 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). The Court was split 5-4, with ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stewart also dissenting. Id. at 43.
Stone reveals the Court's difficulty with the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test,
namely that the statute may have more than one purpose, that different legislators
in the same assembly may have different purposes in mind, and that such an inquiry
does not easily lend itself to empirical testing. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63
64
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gion in some areas,70 the states remained completely powerless
to introduce religion into the classrooms.71 In Wallace v. Jaffree,72
70 Developments, supra note 29, at 1655. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court sidestepped the
Lemon test to find state practices respecting religion constitutional. Mirsky, supra
note 36, at 1243-45. In those cases, the Court relied primarily on historical analysis. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-90; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-78. Marsh concerned the
Nebraska state legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer given by
a state-paid chaplain. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784-85. The Marsh Court upheld the practice and concluded that because legislative chaplains existed when the Bill of Rights
was drafted, its authors could not have intended to declare their own actions unconstitutional. Id. at 790. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First
Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and
also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.
Id.
The Marsh Court failed to apply the standards established in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
even though the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that
the state practice violated those standards. Id. at 786. Professor Smith has suggested that the Court validated the longstanding practice of legislative prayer in an
effort of self-preservation. SMITH, supra note 2, at 258. To do otherwise, according
to Professor Smith, would have created a public uproar which, in turn, may have led
to the passage of an amendment restricting the Court's power of review in Establishment Clause cases. Id.
Lynch tested the constitutionality of a municipality's decision to erect a creche
display each year. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71. The Court acknowledged the religious significance of the creche but noted similar longstanding religious practices
by the government such as the national motto, "In God We Trust," and the phrase
in the Pledge of Allegiance, "One nation under God." Id. at 676. The Court
pragmatically stated that scrutinizing only the religious aspects of any government
activity would inevitably lead to a finding of unconstitutionality. Id. at 680. In this
case, the Court explained, the secular purpose of the municipality was to celebrate
and recognize the origins of a holiday. Id. at 681. The primary effect of the creche,
the Court continued, was at most an incidental advancement of religion, and not
enough to trigger the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 681-83. Finally, the Court found that because the city did not exert any control over the content or design of the creche, and the city's financial contribution to the enterprise
was de minimis, there was no government entanglement with religion. Id. at 683-84.
For further examination of the Supreme Court's holding in Lynch, see Hersman,
supra note 62, at 147-64.
One scholar has criticized the Court for permitting the municipality's annual
erection of the creche display. William Van Alstyne, Trends inthe Supreme Court: Mr.
Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 78287. Professor Van Alstyne criticized the Supreme Court's perfunctory application
of the Lemon test. Id. at 782-83. Professor Van Alstyne suggested that the Court
supplanted the Lemon test with the "any more than" test. Id. at 783. Under the
"any more than" test, according to Professor Van Alstyne, as long as the challenged government practice endorses religion no more than other generally accepted practices, the action will be upheld. Id.
71 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 n.40 (1989) ("A State
may neither allow public-school students to receive religious instruction on public
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the Court examined an Alabama law permitting a one minute period of silence for prayer or meditation at the start of each day in
public school classrooms.7 3 The Court struck the Alabama statute because its sole purpose was to endorse religion."4 The
Court deduced that the statute was devoid of a secular purpose
by examining its legislative history and the testimony of Alabama's Governor and a state senator. 75 Even though the statute
under consideration in Wallace failed to pass constitutional muster, two concurring Justices took pains to state that a similar statschool premises.., nor allow religious school students to receive state-sponsored
education in their religious schools.") (citations omitted).
72 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
73 Id. at 39 n.2. The statute provided:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is
held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute
in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and
during any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.
Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
Two additional statutes were reviewed by the district court. Id. at 41 (citing
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982)). One statute allowed a
period of silence for "meditation" only. Id. at 40 n. 1 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20
(Supp. 1984)). That statute, however, was not reviewed by the Supreme Court because the complainants had abandoned the claim that it was unconstitutional. Id. at
41. The other statute, which provided that teachers "may lead willing students in
prayer" was previously struck down by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Wallace v.
Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984)).
74 Id. at 61. This so-called "endorsement test" was proposed by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch, Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he proper
inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon ... is whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id. at 691
(O'Connor, J. concurring).
One scholarly article posited that an exclusive focus on the purpose of a statute
ignores the more important inquiry of the statute's impact on children in the public
school system. Developments, supra note 29, at 1662-63. The article set forth the
following argument: Even if the statute was implemented with a secular purpose,
its actual effect on children in the classroom must be considered. Id. at 1663.
When a religious majority seeks to express its beliefs, even through a moment of
silence, coercive pressure to conform is imposed on nonadherents. Id. Thus, a
moment of silence statute which purports merely to accommodate the religious
practices of the majority may result in the coercion of nonadherents, a result contrary to the statute's recited purpose of protecting religious freedom. Id. at 166364.
75 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56, 56 n.44. The Court relied heavily on the statement of
the statute's sponsor, state Senator Donald Holmes, who, when asked if he had any
purpose besides permitting prayer in the schools, replied, "No, I did not have no
other purpose in mind." Id. at 57 (quoting App. at 52). The Court observed that
the legislative history also contained a statement by Senator Holmes in which the
Senator expressed that the statute was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to our public
schools .... " Id. at 57 n.43 (quoting App. at 50).

1993]

NOTE

1113

ute would be constitutional if it also had a secular purpose."
One year after the Wallace decision the Court, in Edwards v.
Aguillard," again struck down a state statute for lack of a secular
purpose.78 The Edwards Court reviewed a Louisiana statute that
forbade inclusion of evolution theory in the public school curriculum unless "creation science" was also taught.79 Although
Louisiana recited a secular purpose for the statute, Justice Brennan asserted that the stated legislative purpose must be more
than a mere sham. 80 Justice Brennan concluded that the statute's
sole purpose was to structure the scientific curriculum toward a
particular religious viewpoint. 8 ' Accordingly, the Court found
76 See id. at 66 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "the moment of silence statutes of many States should satisfy the Establishment Clause standard we have here applied"). See also May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d
240 (3d Cir. 1985). In that case the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reviewed a New Jersey "minute of silence" statute. Id. at 241. The statute
provided:
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and secondary
school of each school district in this State shall permit students to
observe a 1 minute period of silence to be used solely at the discretion
of the individual student, before opening exercises of each school day
for quiet and private contemplation or introspection.
Id. (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:36-4 (1983)).
Judge Gibbons, writing for a divided panel, held that because the statute
lacked a secular purpose, it was unconstitutional. Id. at 253. The dissenting judge
in May dismissed the majority's argument that the statute had a religious purpose
merely because two assemblymen favored the statute for religious reasons. Id. at
261 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent postulated that, based on the writings of
the Justices of Supreme Court, the statute would be found constitutional by that
tribunal. Id. at 259 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker argued that a previous
Supreme Court case "supports the proposition that moment of silence statutes that
are permissive and facially neutral presumptively have a secular purpose." Id. at
257 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The United States Supreme Court determined that the complainants in May, former legislative officers, lacked standing,
and dismissed their appeal for want ofjurisdiction. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83
(1987).
77 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
78 Id. at 585, 597.
79 Id. at 581. The statute did not require that either theory be taught, but if one
was included in the curriculum, then both had to be included. Id. (citing LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17:286.4A (West 1982)). The statute was therefore unlike the one in
Epperson, which placed an outright prohibition on the teaching of the theory of
evolution. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968).
80 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
81 Id. at 590. The statute purported to "protect academic freedom." Id. at 586
(citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982)). The Court examined the legislative history of the statute and reasoned that the statute's actual purpose was a
religious one. Id. at 587. In reaching that conclusion the Court observed that the
statute's sponsor stated his preference that the curriculum include neither creation-
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that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.8 2 Thus, for
the fourth time, the Supreme Court invalidated a state law for the
reason that it was clearly devoid of a secular purpose.8 3
After thwarting numerous state attempts to inject religion
into the public schools, the Supreme Court was called upon, in
Board of Education v. Mergens,8 4 to decide the constitutionality of
the Equal Access Act, a federal statute that made it unlawful for
federally funded public schools to deny student religious groups
access to school facilities.8 5 In Mergens, the school board denied a
Christian club the recognition and privileges enjoyed by other
high school clubs.8 6 The school board contended that the Equal
ism nor evolution. Id. That statement, the Court explained, was evidence of a legislative intent to restrict, not encourage academic freedom. Id.
82 Id. at 587-94. Justice Brennan stressed the fiduciary relationship between the
public schools and the community. Id. at 584. The Justice observed that the state
exerts "great authority and coercive power" over public school children and that it
would be a breach of trust to use the public schools to advance religious views that
are not shared by the entire community. Id.
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor concurred, as in Wallace, 472 U.S. 38
(1985), again to express the view that a statute is not necessarily invalid because it
was partially motivated by religion. Id. at 599 (Powell,J., concurring). Justice Powell indicated that for a statute to be struck under the purpose prong, "[t]he religious purpose must predominate." Id.
Justice Scalia issued a scathing dissent. Id. at 610 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice
Scalia challenged the validity of the majority's contention that the statute had no
clear secular purpose. Id. The Justice noted that the Court had drawn that conclusion in prior cases only when the statute was completely devoid of a secular purpose. Id. at 614 (Scalia J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The statute's recited
legislative purpose of protecting academic freedom, reasoned the Justice, was
plainly served. Id. at 629 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia offered the testimony
of a state legislator who expressed that creation science and evolution science are
the only two explanations for the origin of man. Id. at 625 n.3 (Scalia J., dissenting). The clear secular purpose that flows from this statement, Justice Scalia concluded, was the assurance that each student would be free to choose what to believe
about the origin of life. Id. at 627 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
83 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594; see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating one minute period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (striking statute requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in spite of stated secular purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (holding "anti-evolution" statute void for want of a secular purpose).
84 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
85 Id. at 2362. The Equal Access Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
86 Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362. The Christian club sought to use school facilities

1993]

NOTE

1115

Access Act violated the Establishment Clause.8 7 The Court, however, held that the Act was a valid exercise of federal power.8 8
Applying the Lemon test, the Court explained that the congressional objective of preventing discrimination based on religious
affiliation embraced a permissible secular purpose.8 9 Similarly,
the Court continued, the primary effect of the statute was to allow private actors, not the government, to endorse religion. 90 Finally, the Court asserted that granting religious groups access to
for Bible studies, group prayer, and fellowship. Id. The club intended to open
membership to students of all religious affiliations. Id.
87 Id. at 2363. Because the school required a faculty sponsor for all school clubs,
the school board argued that assigning a sponsor to a religious club would impermissibly endorse religion. Id. at 2363-70. Moreover, the school board contended
that a religious club on school grounds would provide the club with the opportunity to proselytize other students. Id. Further, the school board asserted that the
Equal Access Act did not apply to the school because the school did not create a
"limited open forum." Id. at 2365. The Act stated, in pertinent part, that a "limited open forum" exists when a public school "grants an offering to or an opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school
premises during noninstructional time." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1988).
The Court explained that because the term "noncurriculum" was not defined
in the Act, the Court's task would be to interpret the meaning of "noncurriculum."
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2365. Analyzing the plain meaning of "noncurriculum," the
Court began by noting that the Act's legislative intent was to "address perceived
widespread discrimination against religious speech in public schools." Id. at 2366.
The Court observed that the school recognized over thirty clubs, including a rotary
club, a chess club, a scuba diving club, and a photography club. Id. at 2368. The
Court concluded that an interpretation that would allow the school to arbitrarily
define "curriculum" to mean virtually anything but a religious club would defeat
the desired result of Congress in passing the Act. Id. at 2369. The Court found
that because other clubs recognized by the school were "noncurriculum" clubs, a
"limited open forum" existed. Id. The Court therefore concluded that the Christian club was entitled to the protection of the Equal Access Act. Id.
88 Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373.
89 Id. at 2371.
90 Id. at 2372. The Court stated that "there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect." Id. By way of illustration, the Mergens Court examined Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981), in which a student religious group challenged a state university policy of denying religious groups equal access to university facilities. W1idmar,
454 U.S. at 265. The university defended on the ground that it had a compelling
interest in separating church and state as required by the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 270. The Court rejected arguments that the primary effect of an equal access
policy would be advancement of religion and held that the university's attempt to
exclude religious groups from an open forum violated "the fundamental principle
that a state regulation of speech should be content neutral." Id. at 273-77. One
commentator, however, has taken the view that religious clubs have the tendency of
allowing members to proselytize other students. Ruti Teitel, When Separate is Equal:
Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81
Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 178 (1986).
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school facilities does not amount to impermissible government
entanglement with religion. 9
Against this background, the United States Supreme Court
decided Lee v. Weisman. 92 In Lee, the Court considered whether
an invocation at a public school graduation ceremony violates the
Establishment Clause. 3 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
declined petitioner's invitation to reconsider the principles established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which prohibited the states from introducing religious exercises in public schools. 94 The Court
held, therefore, that the invocation at issue in Lee violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 95
The Court proceeded to examine the extent of the Providence, Rhode Island school system's involvement with religion.9"
Justice Kennedy explained that the actions of the school principal, who elected to have a rabbi deliver an invocation at Weisman's middle school graduation ceremony, were attributable to
the state.9 7 The state, through the school principal, not only
chose the speaker, the Justice continued, but also directed the
content of the prayer. 98 According to the majority, the princi91 Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370. The Court rejected the school's argument that
the appointment of a faculty sponsor would precipitate excessive entanglement
with religion. Id. at 2373. Justice O'Connor observed that the Equal Access Act
prohibits school officials from promoting, leading, or participating in the group's
meetings. Id. The Court maintained that "such custodial oversight of the studentinitiated religious group, merely to ensure order and good behavior does not impermissibly entangle the government in the day-to-day surveillance or administration of religious activities." Id. The Court postulated that recognition of clubs
regardless of affiliation would actually avoid entanglement with religion because
the state could not control the admission of those clubs to the school. Id. The
Court reasoned that a state's attempts to exclude religious speech, which would
require the state to monitor group meetings, might well involve more entanglement with religion than an equal access policy. Id.
92 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
93 Id. at 2652.
94 Id. at 2655. The United States, as amicus, also urged the Court to reconsider
the principles set forth in Lemon. Id. For a discussion of Lemon, see supra notes 5862 and accompanying text.
95 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
96 Id.

at 2655-56.

97 Id. at 2655. Justice Kennedy asserted that although the record did not reveal
why a rabbi was chosen, such state involvement with religion carried obvious potential to create divisiveness in the community. Id. at 2655-56.
98 Id. at 2656. Justice Kennedy noted that the school principal provided the
speaker with a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" and recommended that the invocation be nonsectarian. Id. Justice Kennedy reminded that
" 'it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on by
government.'" Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
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pal's advice to the rabbi to offer a nonsectarian prayer amounted
to an impermissible government involvement in the content of
prayer.99 Although the invocation was influenced by both Judaism and Christianity rather than by one religion, the Court explained, it was undeniably a religious exercise that was virtually
obligatory. 0 0 The Court maintained that government directed
prayers, even nonsectarian prayers, are prohibited by the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses.' 0 '
Having concluded that the graduation prayers were statesanctioned, the Supreme Court considered the positions of the
student proponents of and objectors to school graduation
prayers. 0'°2 The majority identified the subtle coercive pressure
that might be placed upon students who do not wish to partici3 Justice Kennedy asserted that coerpate in religious exercises.' O
cive pressure, which may exist in any setting, is particularly
evident in the public schools.'0 4 The majority observed that an
invocation in a school ceremony exerts peer pressure on dissenting students to stand for the prayer or, at a minimum, to remain
99 Id. Attempts to include several religions may serve to narrow the number of
dissenters, the Court observed, but may also cause them to feel an even greater
sense of isolation. Id. at 2659.
100 Id. at 2656.
101 See id. The Court recognized the sense of community that could be achieved
through a more inclusive prayer but cautioned that the state is without power to
control such decisions, regardless of its motive. Id. The Court reasoned that the
transmission of religious beliefs is a wholly private matter. Id. This, according to
the majority, means that the Constitution not only protects the rights of the dissenting non-believer, but also operates to insulate religion from state intervention.
Id. The Court quoted the principal drafter of the Bill of Rights, James Madison,
who said: " '[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.' "

Id. at 2657 (quoting James Madison, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGious ASSESSMENTS (1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (W. Rachal, et al.
eds., 1973)).
102 Id. at 2657-60.
103 Id. at 2658 (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg,J., concurring)).
Although Justice Kennedy is a modern proponent of a "coercion" analysis, the Justice is not the first to propose such a theory. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson (examining
the allegation that students were "coerced" into religious training). In Zorach, the
Court found no evidence of coercion in the record, but stated that if coercion were
used to compel participation in the program, "a wholly different case would be
presented." Id. See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23
(1963) (distinguishing between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause in that the former requires a showing of coercion).
104 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
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silent during the exercise. 0 5 That pressure, according to the majority, could instill in a reasonable dissenter the belief that her
standing for the prayer actually signified participation in the exercise.10 6 The Court concluded that the dissenter would thus be
placed in the position of either participating or protesting, a position that, insofar as it involves school children, collides with the
1 7
Establishment Clause. 0
The majority next addressed the concerns of the invocation
proponents. 10 8 The Court acknowledged that the importance of
graduation ceremonies was the justification offered by the school
district for permitting the formal prayer. °9 The Court asserted,
however, that the importance of the event augmented the risk
that those who did not wish to join in religious prayer would be
compelled."10
1o5 Id. The Justice acknowledged that to believers the prayer merely represented
a request that non-adherents respect their beliefs. Id. The Court explained that
the dissenter, however, perceives that the state is using its power to impose the
beliefs of the majority on her. Id.
106 Id. The majority averred that "pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as
real as any overt compulsion." Id. The majority recognized that some adult nonbelievers would not object simply to standing in respectful silence while others
joined in a prayer. Id. The Court stated, however, that the state may not subject
high school age children to state-composed prayers in which the non-believer has
no real opportunity to avoid participation. Id. at 2658-59.
107 Id. The Court relied partly on psychological research to reach that conclusion. See id. at 2659. The Court reasoned that modern psychology supports the
assumption that young people are particularly susceptible to peer pressure. Id.
Given that fact, the Court explained that the Establishment Clause is no more lenient with the use of social pressure to compel religious conformance than it is with
the use of more direct means. Id.
108 Id. at 2659-60.
109 Id. at 2659. The Court explained that the importance of the ceremony to

both the believers and the dissenter was the principal reason why the prayer must
not be allowed. Id. The majority recognized that the religious believers had a substantial interest in seeking divine guidance, but averred that the dissenter was protected from being compelled into religious conformance by the state. Id. at 2660.
110 Id. The Court stated that the Government's position was that the non-believer must act to avoid infringement on her religious freedom. Id. The majority
asserted that such a view "turn[ed] conventional First Amendment analysis on its
head." Id. The majority explained that the Court had long before settled the principle that a state may not compose prayers to be said in the public schools even if
participation and attendance was voluntary. Id. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963)).
The majority recognized the paradox that students who, in the course of their
public school educations, had been subjected to irreligious and offensive ideas,
would now be denied a two minute prayer at their graduation. Id. at 2657. Justice
Kennedy explained, however, that our pluralistic society requires tolerance of
speech that may be offensive to the listener. Id. The toleration of such speech, the
Justice continued, is protected by a different mechanism than that by which freedom of religion is secured. Id. The Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy clari-
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Moreover, the Court was unpersuaded by arguments that
the prayer was of a de minimis nature.I" Even though the prayer
was brief, the Court explained, the intrusion extended beyond its
two minute length." 2 The Court also rejected the contention
that attendance at the ceremony was voluntary. 1 3 Although attendance at the ceremony was voluntary in the literal sense, the
majority asserted that, in reality, absence from one's own high
school graduation would be a forfeiture of the intangible benefits
of the ceremony.114

The majority distinguished the instant matter from Marsh v.
Chambers," 5 and posited that the state legislative prayer validated
in Marsh involved adults who were free to come and go during
the prayers. 1 6 In the present case, the Court continued, the students were subjected to the authority and influence of teachers
and had no real opportunity to avoid the prayer. 1 7 The Court
recited its longstanding contention that Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues to be delicate and fact-sensitive, and refused to extend the Marsh rule to a public school case." 8 Thus,
fled, forbids state intervention in religious matters, whereas speech is assured full
expression even when the government is a participant. Id.
I'

Id. at 2659.

Id. The fact that the prayer lasted roughly two minutes, the majority stated,
was immaterial. Id. The de minimis argument, furthermore, would disrespectfully
minimize the religious significance of the rabbi's presence and purpose in offering
the prayer. Id.
'13 Id. at 2659.
114 Id. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that attendance at the graduation ceremony was not a precondition to receipt of a diploma. Id. Justice Kennedy, however, wrote:
Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school
graduation is one of life's most significant occasions. A school rule
which excuses attendance is beside the point. Attendance may not be
required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free
to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense of the
term 'voluntary' .... "
Id.
115 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
116 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
117 Id. The majority explained that Marsh expressly recognized the distinction
between public schools and legislative sessions. Id. (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
The Court observed that during a high school graduation, the school administration exercises considerable control over nearly all aspects of the ceremony, including the dress, the behavior of the students, movements and timing, as well as the
contents of the program. Id. (citation omitted).
118 Id. at 2661. The Court again stressed that in cases involving school prayer,
the early precedents of Engel and Schernpp still control. Id. See supra notes 40-53 and
accompanying text. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (expressing that "we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law").
112
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while the Court acknowledged that it would be unconstitutional
to attempt to remove religion from public life completely," 9 the
Court proclaimed that it is not permissible for a state to inject
religion into a public school ceremony in which young graduates

120
have no choice but to conform.

Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor, concurred. 12' TheJustice first detailed relevant pub-

lic school cases. 122 These cases, Justice Blackmun explained, revealed that government may not endorse, sponsor, or involve
itself with religion. 23 The Justice made clear that it was on the
basis of these precedents and not merely on the basis of "coer124
cion" that he joined the ma*

119 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661. The Justice explained: "A relentless and all-pervasive
attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become
inconsistent with the Constitution." Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122 Id. at 2662-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun examined the
seminal case of Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1948), and stressed that
Everson demanded that there be a "wall of separation between church and State."
Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2662 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
Justice Blackmun also reaffirmed the validity of the early school prayer cases, Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963). Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Justice noted
that in Engel the Court invalidated a statute that purported to be denominationally
neutral and that did not require the participation of all students. Id. (citing Engel,
370 U.S. at 430). TheJustice explained that the Court reached that result because
the Establishment Clause forbade the government to use its power to influence
religion. Id. Justice Blackmun further observed that the Schempp Court invalidated
Bible reading in schools because it had the primary effect of advancing religion. Id.
at 2663 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968), the Justice continued, the Court similarly struck down an "anti-evolution"
statute because it aided religion. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
Finally, the Justice explained that since 1971, the Court has relied on the principles
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), which prohibit government action that has the purpose or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion or that fosters government entanglement with religion. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2663
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124 Id. ,at 2664-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun stated:
"Although our precedents make clear that proof of government coercion is not
necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient." Id. at 2664
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun explained that "[t]he rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest
touch of governmental hand." Id. at 2665 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). The Justice further postulated
that "[a] government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created
equal when it asserts that God prefers some." Id. The Justice explained that, once
the state assumes the role of religious arbiter, even the favored religion might be
the target of manipulation by government officials. Id. at 2666 (Blackmun, J., con-
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Justice Souter, joined by justices Stevens and O'Connor, authored a separate concurring opinion. 2 5 Justice Souter first addressed the claim that the Framer's intent was not to prohibit aid
to all religions, but rather to prevent the government from favoring one religion over another. 126 TheJustice charged that an historical analysis is inconclusive 2 7 and asserted that Supreme
Court precedent over four decades unequivocally demonstrates
that a state law favoring all religions would violate the Constitution just as easily as a law that favors one religion over
another. 128
Justice Souter next considered whether coercion must be
shown to constitute an Establishment Clause violation. 29 The
Justice observed that the Court had invalidated numerous noncoercive statutes, 3 and concluded that coercion was not a necescurring). Religion in the hands of private actors, observed the Justice, is a far more
desirable result. Id.
125 Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter identified and addressed
two issues: whether the Establishment Clause applied to government action that
does not favor one religion over others, and whether government coercion of religious conformity, independent of governmental endorsement, was required to constitute an Establishment Clause violation. Id.
126 Id. at 2667-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 2668-70 (Souter,J., concurring). Justice Souter examined the history of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to determine whether they prohibited
the government from favoring all religions. Id. at 2670 (Souter, J., concurring).
Justice Souter, having examined the evolution of the First Amendment from its
initial draft through the final version, concluded that the drafters not only rejected
language that would allow the establishment of a particular religion, but also rejected language that would permit the government to favor all religions. Id.
128 Id. at 2667-70 (Souter,J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Souter had
faith in the Court's precedent, stating: "Such is the settled law. Here, as elsewhere,
we should stick to it absent some compelling reason to discard it." Id. at 2668
(Souter, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 2671-73 (Souter,J., concurring) (citing Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). Justice
Souter explained that in Allegheny County, for example, the Court invalidated a
state's practice of displaying a nativity scene, not because it coerced anyone to view
the display, but because it represented an impermissible state endorsement of religion. Id. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 58994, 598-602). Similarly, in Wallace, the Justice continued, the Court struck down a
"moment of silence" statute that did not coerce student participation in prayer but
did convey a message of government endorsement of religion. Id. (citing Wallace,
472 U.S. at 61). Justice Souter further noted that the Court invalidated an "antievolution" statute in Epperson, not on the basis of coercion, but because it had a
purely religious purpose. Id. (citing Epperson, 343 U.S. at 89). Finally, Justice Souter reviewed the case of Grand Rapids, in which the Court invalidated a state's practice of sending public school teachers to religious schools to teach secular classes.
Id. The Justice explained that even though no one was coerced to participate, the
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sary element in an Establishment Clause violation.' 3 '
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White and Justice Thomas, dissented. 3 2 Justice Scalia began by
criticizing the majority for eradicating a tradition dating back to
the first public school graduation ceremony.1 33 Justice Scalia indicated that the nature of constitutional principles should not depend upon the theories of individual Justices, but should be
rooted in the nation's history and the intent of the founding fathers.' 34 The dissent determined that these standards, applied to
the case at bar, would compel a result different than that reached
13 5
by the majority.
The dissent also disputed the majority's finding that the state
controlled the prayers.' 3 6 Justice Scalia reasoned that the7
school's principal did not draft, edit, or censor the invocation.'3
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the principal invited the rabbi to
speak at the ceremony, provided him with a pamphlet, and advised him that the invocation should be nonsectarian, but denied
that the principal's conduct amounted to state control of a relistate conveyed a message of state approval of religion. Id. (citing Grand Rapids, 473
U.S. at 397).
13' Id.
132 Id. at 2678 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that "[b]y one account, the first public-high-school graduation ceremony took place in Connecticut
in July 1868 . . . when '151 seniors from Norwich Free Academy marched in their
Sunday suits and dresses into a church hall and waited through majestic music and
long prayers.' " Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia
explained that nonsectarian prayer is not only acceptable at a high school graduation ceremony, but is also part of traditional American celebrations in general. Id.
at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally MCMILLAN, supra note 51, at 75-119
(providing an expansive discussion of the history of religion in the public schools).
134 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia declared that,
because the majority was so "oblivious" to the nation's history, a review was in
order. Id. Justice Scalia quoted language from the inaugural addresses of George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Bush, each of which
contained exhortations for divine guidance. Id. at 2679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Justice declared that Congress and theJudiciary also engage in religious practices. Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also cited the Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 (1983), which validated the Nebraska
state legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's own sessions, the Justice explained, open with the invocation "God save the United States and This Honorable
Court." Id.
135 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia expressed that
"the longstanding American tradition of prayer at official ceremonies displays with
unmistakable clarity that the Establishment Clause does not forbid the government
to accommodate it." Id.
136 Id. at 2682-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's
definition of coercion. 3 9 Justice Scalia doubted that the students
were really coerced into doing anything.140 The type of coercion
prohibited by the Establishment Clause, the Justice opined, is of
a stronger sort than that contemplated by the majority. 14' Examining past cases where the Court invalidated religious practices in
the schools, the Justice observed that the state action was
138

Id.

139 Id. Justice Scalia observed that the majority relied primarily on a coercion

analysis to invalidate the invocation and ignored the standards enunciated in Lemon
v.Kurtzman. Id. at 2685 (Scalia,J., dissenting). While Justice Scalia approved of the
majority's failure to utilize those standards, the Justice lamented that "the Court
has replaced Lemon with its psycho-coercion test, which suffers the double disability
of having no roots whatever in our people's historic practice, and being as infinitely
expandable as the reasons for psychotherapy itself." Id.
140 See id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice exclaimed that the idea
that a student who chooses to sit during the invocation can be deemed to have
participated in the prayer "is nothing short of ludicrous." Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia opined that it was also a considerable stretch in reasoning to say that a student who simply stands when all others bow their heads could
be thought to have joined in the exercise. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia argued that even if an objector to the prayer were "subtly coerced" to stand,
the prayer should still be upheld. Id. The Justice maintained that the state's interest in accommodating religion constitutionally trumps the student dissenters' rights
to be free from subtle coercion. Id.
Justice Scalia further explained that the Court neglected to consider that the
students actually rose for the Pledge of Allegiance and remained standing for the
invocation. Id. Justice Scalia observed that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
of Allegiance, under the majority's analysis, would subject the Pledge to the same
scrutiny given to the invocation. Id. Although the Court had previously held that
no student could be forced to recite the Pledge, Justice Scalia queried whether students could not even be compelled to maintain respectful silence while the Pledge
was recited. Id. (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
The dissent also criticized the majority for declining to decide whether the psychological coercion exerted on high school students would be permitted by the
Establishment Clause where mature adults are concerned. Id. Justice Scalia asserted that high school graduation was a symbolic passage from childhood to young
adulthood and disagreed with the Court's treatment of high school students "as
though they were first-graders." Id. Justice Scalia queried whether the Court
would now develop a jurisprudence which differentiates between immature and mature adults. Id.
141 Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted that "[tihe coercion
that was a hallmark of establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penal/y." Id. In colonial
Virginia, Justice Scalia explained, the Church of England controlled the rites given
by ministers, required church attendance, and taxed citizens to support the established church. Id. (citation omitted). The Justice agreed that the Establishment
Clause proscribes such action, which constitutes "a brand of coercion that, happily,
is readily discernable to those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples
of Blackstone rather than of Freud." Id. at 2683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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deemed coercive because the students were subject to compulsory school attendance laws.' 4 2 Justice Scalia noted that these
cases involved an instructional setting where students' parents
were not present to counter the effects of peer pressure. 4 3 The
Justice explained that there was no coercion in Lee because it involved a voluntary ceremony that students attended with their
44

parents. 1

Finally, the dissent contended that the majority failed to ad-

dress adequately the interests of those who desired the prayer. ,45

Justice Scalia argued that prayer is not just a private activity, but
rather one that many adherents would choose to do in public. 146
The Justice asserted that when a group of diverse people pray
together, the net result is a positive one. 14 7 Justice Scalia concluded that the majority's decision to favor a non-believer, who
merely suffered the inconvenience of standing in respectful silence, at the expense of many who desired voluntary
prayer, was
148
senseless in policy and unsupported in law.

The Lee decision marks the first time the Supreme Court has
struck down a government practice respecting religion solely on
the basis of "coercion. '149 According to the majority, there ex142 Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)). Justice Scalia
explained that in both Engel and Schempp, the Court emphasized that students were
legally compelled to attend school. Id. The issue presented in the framework of
legal coercion, the Justice asserted "is quite different from the question of whether
forbidden coercion exists in an environment utterly devoid of legal compulsion." Id. at
2684-85 (Scalia J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 Id.

145

Id.

Id. at 2685-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained that the majority's inquiry, whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the state from subjecting
student dissenters to psychological coercion, missed the Constitutional issue in the
case. Id. The real question, Justice Scalia continued, was whether the Constitution
mandated that the religious majority succumb to the student dissenters. Id. at 2686
(Scalia, J., dissenting). "As the age-old practices of our people show," Justice Scalia
concluded, "the answer to that question is not at all in doubt." Id.
147 See id.
148 Id. The dissent acknowledged that no one should be forced to participate in
religion, but thought it "a shame" that the Court had deprived the American people the opportunity to join in prayer voluntarily. Id.
149 See id. at 2664 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (noting that coercion is not a necessary, but a sufficient, condition to finding a violation of the Establishment Clause).
The potential for coercion in the public schools was mentioned in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962),
but was never utilized as an independent basis to invalidate a state law. See Lee, 112
S. Ct. at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the Court "could not adopt [a
coercion analysis] without abandoning our settled law"). Just three years before
146
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ists "subtle coercive pressure"' 5 0 in the public school environment, which warrants special protection for impressionable
young people against the influences of government-sponsored
religion.'
The Lee decision, therefore, apparently forecloses
the possibility of any state-sponsored prayer in the public

schools. 52 Even a voluntary, two-minute, nondenominational
prayer before an audience of high school graduates will not be
permitted so long as the state has control of the exercise. 153

The four-justice dissent, on the other hand, outlined a more
rugged standard for coercion. 54 The dissent would find an Establishment Clause violation only where an unwilling participant
was legally coerced into a religious practice.1 5 5 Therefore, even
if Deborah Weisman was subtly coerced to participate in the
prayer, the dissent would not have found an Establishment
Clause violation. 1 56 Thus, while the Court is unified as to the
the Lee decision, the Court had explicitly rejected the coercion analysis used to invalidate the state practice at issue in Lee. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 597-98 n.47 (1989). Despite the utilization of a new test, the Court did not
stray from a long line of precedent in which almost every state attempt to introduce
prayer into the public school setting had been invalidated. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at
2667-70 (Souter, J., concurring).
150 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
151 Id. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). In Aguillard,Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary
schools. Families entrust public schools with the education of their
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that
may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family.
Id. at 583-84.
152 See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59. The Court recognized that attendance at the
ceremony at issue in Lee was in a real sense compulsory, and that students and
teachers, by participating in the prayer, created a subtle pressure on other attending students to participate. Id. at 2658-59. The Court concluded that "the State
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary
school children in this position." Id.
153 See id. at 2655-61.
154 See id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155 Id. Justice Scalia asserted:
[T]here is simply no support for the proposition that the officially
sponsored nondenominational invocation and benediction read by
Rabbi Gutterman-with no one legally coerced to recite them-violated the Constitution of the United States. To the contrary, they are
so characteristically American they could have come from the pen of
George Washington or Abraham Lincoln himself.
Id. at 2684.
156 See id. at 2683 (Scalia J., dissenting).
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principle that the state may not compel or coerce anyone to say a
prayer,157 there is substantial division as to what degree of"coercion" is necessary for a finding of unconstitutionality.'
While there was an expectation that the Court might revamp
or at least refine the Lemon test,' 5 9 the Court here did not need to
look beyond the finding of coercion. 60 Rather than analyze the
district and circuit courts' application of Lemon in deciding the Lee
case, the Court simply found that coercion was a sufficient condition precedent to unconstitutionality.' 6 ' Perhaps this methodology will place lower courts in a quandary as to the proper test in
Establishment Clause cases. It is clear, nevertheless, that constitutional adjudication in this area continues to be "delicate and
fact sensitive." 162
Though the courts are left without fixed standards, Justice
See id. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
See id. at 2658-59 ("government may no more use social pressure to enforce
orthodoxy than it may use more direct means"); cf id. at 2684 (ScaliaJ., dissenting)
("there is simply no support for the proposition that the officially sponsored nondenominational invocation and benediction read by Rabbi Gutterman-with no
one legally coerced to recite them-violated the Constitution"). Justice Blackmun
and Justice Souter each concurred separately, partly to express that coercion is not
a necessary element in an Establishment Clause violation. See id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id.at 2672 (Souter J., concurring).
159 See id.at 2655; Mawdsley & Russo, supra note 5, at 201 (asserting that the
Supreme Court was likely to reformulate the Lemon test in the Lee case).
160 The Court's jurisprudence in this area is founded on the basic premise that
the Constitution has erected a "wall of separation" between government and religion. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). In Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court announced the purpose and primary
effect test. Id. at 222. The entanglement prong was added in Waltz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), and the three pronged test was assembled in
the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Justice O'Connor
has recently proposed that the inquiry should be whether the challenged government act has the purpose or primary effect of endorsing religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984) (O'ConnorJ., concurring). The Court has since
apparently adopted Justice O'Connor's view. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
60-61 (1985). Despite this long line of precedent and apparently clear tests, the
circuit courts continue to be split on some Establishment Clause issues. See, e.g.,
supra note 20.
161 See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court also
refused to apply the Lemon test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See
supra note 70 (discussing Mfarsh).
162 See Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2661. In past cases the Court has particularly relied on
the Lemon test. See id.at 2663-64 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that
since 1971, the Court has utilized the Lemon test in thirty out of thirty-one Establishment Clause cases). Recently in M'arsh v. Chambers, however, the Court did not
apply the test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The following year,
the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly, and utilized what Justice Brennan, in
dissent, called a "relaxed application of the Lemon test." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 713 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's failure to apply the
157

158
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Scalia's dissent provides a method by which the states might
avoid the result reached by the majority.163 According to Justice
Scalia, to avoid a constitutional violation, the school would
merely have to announce that no one is compelled to join in the
prayer, and that standing or sitting in respectful silence during
the invocation does not constitute participation in the exercise. 164 In light of the Court's precedent, however, it is likely that
Justice Scalia has underestimated the Court's resolve to restrain
the states from establishing religious practices in the public
schools. 165

A more effective method of avoiding constitutional scrutiny
might be to remove partially the state from the enterprise. If the
selection of a graduation speaker is left to private individuals
such as parents and students, it may be less likely that the Court
would find an Establishment Clause violation. Even the broadest
reading of the Establishment Clause could not preclude private
individuals from "establishing" religion. Second, the Court has
twice upheld religious practices in the schools where the students
1 66
and parents, not the state, desired the religious practice.
Therefore, both the text of the Constitution and Supreme Court
precedent support the proposition that an invocation at a public
high school graduation ceremony would be permissible if the
state took no part in the religious elements of the exercise.
Joseph P. Clemente
test in Lee and heavy criticism of the test from members of the Court and various
scholars leave the future of the Lemon analysis uncertain at best.
163 See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 Id.
165 In the early school prayer cases, upon which the Lee Court relied, there were
stipulations that participation in the school prayer was voluntary. Id. at 2660 (citing
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)). The Lee majority explained that the voluntary nature of
participation did not save the prayer in those cases, and it did not save the prayer in
this case. Id.
166 See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952).

